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Abstract: 
The World Bank (2013) argues that social cohesion shapes the context in which 
entrepreneurs make investment decisions and therefore job creation. In this paper, we focus on 
FDI as one link of primary importance in this argument, and empirically examine the relationship 
between social cohesion and FDI flows.  
Using panel data on 52 middle income countries for the period 1984-2012, we first 
identify social cohesion-related institutions using principal component analysis and then examine 
the influence of those institutions individually and as a principal component on FDI flows. PCA 
identifies religion in politics, internal and external conflicts, and ethnic tensions as institutions 
with highest loadings. Adopting dynamic panel estimation methodologies - FE, IV and system 
GMM, the paper finds that religion in politics stands out with its positive influence on FDI 
inflows. A one percentage point improvement in religion in politics increases FDI flows by about 
0.5 percentage point. The positive influence is robust to the estimation methodology adopted and 
to the sample size.  
 The novelty of the paper lies first in identifying social cohesion-related institutions and 
principal component and second in discovering the positive influence of less religion in politics 
on FDI flows to middle income countries.  
 
JEL classification: F21, C23, C26, O12, O17 
Keywords: Social cohesion, FDI, Institutions, Religion in politics, Ethnic tensions, Conflicts, 
Panel data models, Fixed effects, Instrumental variables estimation, System GMM.  
                                                          
1
 I would like to thank Ibrahim Abdalla for help with interpretation of principal component results of an 
earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to Amany Al Anshasy, Paul Alagidede, Mohamed Belkhair, 
Abdulnasser Hatemi, Hideyuki Kamiryo, Selini Katsaiti, Chiraz Labidi, Louis Jaeck, Osiris Parcero, Emilie 
Rutledge, Mrittika Shamsuddin, Osama Sweidan, Mariko Watanabe, Fernando Zanella, and participants at 
the Western Economic Association International 10
th
 Biennial Pacific Rim conference in Tokyo, Japan, the 
second Critical Studies in Accounting and Finance Conference in Abu Dhabi, UAE, and the Department of 
Economics and Finance Research Seminar Series (United Arab Emirates University) for helpful comments 
and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. All errors are mine.    
 
2 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Calls for social cohesion or shared and inclusive societies have gone beyond immigrant-
receiving countries, such as Canada and Australia, to Arab Spring countries experiencing political 
and social developments over the past three years. Recently this issue has attracted the attention 
of the World Bank, which focused in its World Development Report 2013 on job creation as a 
root of social cohesion. Though it is not a straightforward and specific concept to define, the 
World Bank (2013) defines social cohesion as the capacity of societies to manage collective 
decision making peacefully without conflicts.
2
 
OECD (2012) stresses the multi-dimensionality of the concept, and points out that social 
cohesion is comprised of social exclusion, social capital, and social mobility. Social exclusion 
takes place when “all individuals and groups are wholly or partly prevented from participating in 
their society and in various aspects of cultural and community life” (Bossert et al. 2007).3 
Socially excluded individuals suffer poor education, training, employment, transportation, access 
to functioning, and financial resources, which affect their earnings (Bossert et al. 2007; Lucas 
2012, Sen 1985; Stanley et al. 2012; Teraji 2011).
4
 Social capital, the second component of social 
cohesion, combines measures of trust and various behavioral forms of civic engagement 
(Bourdieu 1993; Dickes et al. 2011; Lin 2001; Putnam 1995). Trust is associated with the 
presence of formal and informal social networks. Social capital requires the presence of processes 
and institutions, in particular voice and accountability, and inclusive participation of diverse 
groups, which shape individual and group interactions and social relations (World Bank 2013). 
Social mobility, the third component, reflects people’s belief and capabilities to progress in 
society. 
Social cohesion has been argued to have its economic payoffs.
5
 Collective decision 
making serves the provision of public goods through voluntary contribution (Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2000). In fractionalized societies the provision of public goods tends to be weaker 
(Alesina et al. 1999; Keefer and Khemani 2005). 
Social capital and trust help create an economic and political environment conducive to 
growth.
6
 Trust reduces transactions cost and uncertainty, eases coordination and cooperation 
among individuals, groups and firms, and helps in the exchange of knowledge and furthering 
innovation (Foa 2011; World Bank 2013). The economic and social inclusion of communities and 
individuals enhances trust in the ability of the government to undertake growth-oriented 
economic and political reforms, even if it is painful (Easterly et al. 2006) and increases the 
economy’s resilience to external shocks. Rodrik (1999) argues that divided societies, ethnically 
and economically, with weak institutions are less resilient to external shocks than united societies 
with high quality institutions. Fractionalization influences the quality and effectiveness of public 
institutions thus acting as a constraint on politicians’ efforts to undertake reforms (Alesina et al. 
                                                          
2
 While international organizations, such as OECD, and governments, such as the Australian and Canadian 
governments, have focused on the multi-facet nature of the concept with a range of broad indicators, 
empirical studies have focused on limited number of indicators driven by data availability, such as 
fractionalization as in Alesina et al. (2003) and Easterly et al. (2006) and ethnic tensions as in Baliamoune-
Lutz and Mavrotas (2009) and Baliamoune-Lutz (2005). 
3
 Bossert et al (2007) argue that social exclusion is a relative and dynamic concept. An individual feels 
socially excluded relative to other members of society. In addition the deprivation of individual may persist 
or worsen over time. 
4
 See Teraji (2011) on how poor education and training affects individuals opportunities and earnings, 
Lucas (2012) and Stanley et al (2012) on the influence of transportation on social exclusion, and Bossert et 
al (2007) and Sen (1985) on functionings. 
5
 See Foa (2011). 
6
 Easterly and Levine (1997) find negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on growth, while Alesina et al. 
(2003) find negative effect of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. 
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2003; Mauro 1995). Social capital is associated with better school effectiveness, collective health 
and well-being (Putnam 1995; Sobel 2002). Social mobility may be influenced by 
industrialization, economic inequality, migration, and political regimes (Yaish and Andersen 
2012). 
 In this paper we explore the benefits of social cohesion further. World Bank (2013) 
argues that social cohesion shapes the context in which entrepreneurs make investment decisions 
and therefore job creation. We focus on the first relationship in the World Bank argument that 
social cohesion matters for investors and shapes their decisions to invest. Our emphasis in this 
paper is on foreign investors’ realized FDI flows. Out of the three facets of social cohesion – 
social exclusion, social capital, and social mobility – social capital is the most relevant facet to 
this paper. 
 As mentioned above, social capital combines measures of trust and behavioral forms of 
civic engagement. Trust is associated with the presence of formal institutions and informal social 
networks. Social capital thus requires the presence of a) formal institutions, such as voice and 
accountability and civic participation, and possibly government stability and rule of law, and b) 
informal social networks, which develop in presence of trust in society. 
 In this paper we empirically examine the influence of social cohesion-related institutions 
on FDI flows. We first identify those institutions using principal component analysis (PCA) and 
International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) political risk indicators. PCA identifies religion in 
politics, internal and external conflicts, and ethnic tensions as institutions with highest loadings 
on a notably “social cohesion” principal component. These indicators correspond to the formal 
institutions of the social capital component of social cohesion. We then examine the influence of 
those institutions individually and of the social cohesion principal component on FDI inflows. We 
adopt dynamic panel estimation methodologies: fixed effects (FE), instrumental variables (IV) 
and two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM). The paper finds that, out of the 
four identified social cohesion-related institutions, religion in politics stands out with its positive 
influence on FDI inflows. A one percentage point improvement in religion in politics increases 
FDI flows by about 0.5 percentage point. This influence is robust to changes in estimation 
methodologies and sample size.  
  This paper is different from the previous literature in two main respects. First, although 
the concept of social cohesion has been discussed in the literature, no study to the best of our 
knowledge has identified social cohesion institutions. In this paper, we do not impose a specific 
measure of social cohesion and seek to identify the relevant institutions empirically using 
statistical methods though we are guided by previous theoretical definitions of social cohesion. 
Second, while previous research examined the effect of social cohesion on growth, pro-
development policies, policy reforms and resilience to external shocks, the effect of social 
cohesion on foreign investors’ FDI flows has not been examined before to the best of our 
knowledge. 
 The structure of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical model 
and data.  Section 3 discusses the empirical issues and estimation methodology. Sections 4 and 5 
present and discuss the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
 
a. Empirical Model 
The empirical model of this paper builds on the location advantage hypothesis of 
Dunning’s (1981) ownership-location-internalization (OLI) paradigm. According to the OLI 
paradigm, a firm produces abroad building on three types of advantages: ownership (O), location 
(L), and internalization (I). A firm’s ownership advantages arise from its possession of intangible 
assets, such as technology, patents, and skilled management. The firm itself does not possess 
location advantages but rather the host economy it invests in. For example, the host economy may 
enjoy large market size and potential, cheap skilled labor, developed infrastructure, openness to 
trade and capital flows, developed financial markets, friendly business environment, and quality 
domestic institutions. Domestic institutions may influence social cohesion. The internalization 
advantage emanates from the firm’s own engagement in production abroad rather than relying on 
the market, in the form of licensing or subcontracting for example, because of the higher 
transaction costs of the latter. 
 Since the purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of host country social cohesion on 
foreign entrepreneurs’ FDI flows, we focus on the location advantage hypothesis. We express the 
empirical model as: 
 
FDIi,t= β0 + β1 FDIi,t-1 + β2 GROWTHi,t + β3 TRADEi,t + β4 FINANCEi,t +   β5 
INFRASTRUCTUREi,t + β6 COHESIONi,t + εi,t   (1) 
where FDI is FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, GROWTH is market potential as measured by 
real GDP growth rate, TRADE is trade openness as measured by the sum of imports and exports 
as a percentage of GDP, FINANCE is the degree of financial development as measured by the 
total value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP, INFRASTRUCTURE is the degree of 
infrastructure development as measured by the number of telephone lines per 100 people, and 
COHESION is the individual social cohesion-related institutions and principal component, as 
identified and extracted by PCA.
7,8
 With the exception of real GDP growth rate, these variables 
are in logarithmic form. 
 A number of domestic institutions may in principle be correlated with the degree of social 
cohesion in a country. Countries in which laws do not differentiate between citizens and are 
enforced equally on them are likely to be more socially cohesive and less fractionalized.  The 
presence of stable governments may suggest the absence or presence of little divisions and 
government popularity among citizens. Divisions along racial, nationality, or language lines may 
be associated with ethnic tensions and thus reduce social cohesion. Civil wars, political violence 
and terrorism ignite internal conflicts and weaken social cohesion. External conflicts may induce 
internal conflicts and ethnic tensions, which in turn weaken social cohesion. Politicians may use 
religion to manipulate people. Extremism and fanaticism in religion and its manipulation to serve 
political purposes may result in intolerance and friction among people inducing ethnic tensions, 
internal and possibly external conflicts, which reduce social cohesion. The military may 
                                                          
7
 We decided to exclude nominal GDP (in log form) as a measure of market size due to the presence of unit 
root process. First difference of log nominal GDP yields the growth rate.   
8
 A similar model specification is used in Meon and Sekkat (2013), who study the role of institutions and 
trust in promoting FDI flows. They explain FDI flows in terms of GDP, GDP growth, GDP per capita, 
infrastructure (measured by the percentage of paved roads in total roads), education (measured by primary 
school enrollment), openness (measured by the indicator of economic openness produced by Economic 
Freedom Network), institutions (measured by ICRG’s investment profile and the World Bank’s formal 
protection of misbehavior of directors), trust (obtained from World Values Survey), and an interaction term 
for institutions and trust.   
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manipulate internal conflicts and ethnic tensions in order to remain in power at the expense of 
reduced social cohesion. 
 
b. Data 
In our analysis we use panel data on a sample of 52 middle income countries covering the 
period 1984-2012. These countries are classified as middle income by the World Bank in July 
2012. In addition to being middle income, the sample countries are characterized by having social 
cohesion (COHESION) and financial development (FINANCE) data available on them from the 
Political Risk Services’ (PRS) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI), respectively. Of these countries eight are from East Asia 
and Pacific, 11 from Europe and Central Asia, 17 from Latin America and Caribbean, six from 
Middle East and North Africa, three from South Asia, and seven are from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The list of countries is provided in Appendix A.  
 Data on FDI inflows are obtained from UNCTADSTAT database.
9
 Data on market 
potential, trade openness, financial development, and the degree of infrastructure development are 
obtained from WDI.
10
 Data on social cohesion-related institutions can be obtained from a number 
of sources, such as ICRG, the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI), and Freedom 
House’s Freedom Index (FI). Table B1 of Appendix B provides a comparison of the components 
of the three indicators, their score ranges and indications, and periods and countries covered.  
 In this paper we use ICRG’s political risk index for two main reasons. First, it covers a 
number of aspects beyond democratic institutions that may influence social cohesion, such as 
government stability, the enforcement of law and order, the presence of internal conflicts and 
ethnic tensions, and the manipulation of religion to serve political purposes. These aspects are 
mostly correlated with WGI’s political stability and to a less extent with FI’s civil liberties, as 
Table B2 of Appendix B shows. However, WGI and FI, aggregated or disaggregated, lump these 
components together and thus hide information that might be useful to this paper. Second, 
compared to WGI and FI, ICRG is available annually and for a longer time period. Yet ICRG is 
available on a fewer number of countries compared to WGI and FI. This limitation is minor given 
that the focus of this paper is on middle income countries that can attract FDI flows.
11
      
 ICRG data include 12 political risk components: a) government stability,  b) 
socioeconomic conditions, c) investment profile, d) internal conflict, e) external conflict, f) 
corruption, g) military in politics, h) religion in politics, i) law and order, j) ethnic tensions, k) 
democratic accountability, and l) bureaucracy quality. Higher (lower) political risk ratings 
indicate lower (higher) risk and better (worse) performance. 
 Out of these ICRG components, we expect law and order, government stability, ethnic 
tensions, internal conflict, external conflict, religion in politics, and military in politics to be 
related to social cohesion.
12
 Law and order assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal 
                                                          
9
 Data are available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx . 
10
 Data are available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all . 
11
 The number of observations on middle income countries with data on value of stocks traded is 1021 
compared to 1870 for all middle income countries.  
12
 We excluded other components in accordance to their definitions. The socioeconomic conditions risk 
component assesses socioeconomic pressures in society regarding unemployment, consumer confidence, 
and poverty. The maximum score is 12. Investment profile assesses risk of expropriation, profit 
repatriation, and payment delays. The maximum score is 12. Corruption assesses political system 
corruption, which constitutes a threat to foreign investment.  Corruption may potentially distort the 
economic and financial environment, and reduce government and business efficiency when associated with 
assumption of power through patronage rather competency. Actual corruption may also take the form of 
demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessments, police protection, or loans. The maximum score is 6. Democratic accountability is a measure 
of how responsive government is to its people. The maximum score is 6. Bureaucracy quality measures the 
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system and the popular observance of the law. The maximum score is 6. Government stability 
measures the ability of the government to undertake its declared program and stay in office. Such 
ability is assessed through government unity, legislative strength and popular support. A popular 
government indicates citizens’ approval of its programs and policies. The maximum score is 12. 
Ethnic tensions measure the degree of tension associated with divisions related to race, 
nationality, or language. The maximum score is 6. Internal conflict measures political violence 
and its impact on governance. High scores indicate no armed or civil opposition to the 
government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against 
its own people on the other hand. The maximum score is 12. External conflict measures the risk 
to the incumbent government of war, cross-border conflict, and foreign pressures. The maximum 
score is 12. Religion in politics measures the domination of society and/or governance by a single 
religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to exclude other religions from 
the political and/or social process. The maximum score is 6. Military in politics assesses the 
degree of involvement of military in politics. Such involvement may diminish democracy or 
cause a threat to an elected civilian government. The maximum score is 6. 
 
  
3. EMPIRICAL ISSUES AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
The empirical methodology of this paper addresses four main issues. The first issue is to identify 
institutions, the second is endogeneity, the third is non-stationarity, and the fourth is the 
logarithmic treatment of negative and zero values.  
 
a. Identification of Social Cohesion Component and Institutions 
The first issue is to identify the institutions, which are likely related to social cohesion. 
Identifying social cohesion-related institutions is not a straightforward task since there is not a 
clear theory or body of empirical literature that addresses social cohesion per se. In the empirical 
literature, the influence of corruption, rule of law, conflicts, or property rights protection, for 
example, on FDI in particular or capital flows in general is examined. For example, previous 
empirical FDI literature shows positive relationship between government stability and law and 
order on the one hand and FDI flows on the other (Chakrabarti 2001; Asiedu 2006; Mishra and 
Daly 2007; Naudé and Krugell 2007; Kolstad and Wiig 2012). The literature also shows negative 
relationship between ethnic tensions, internal conflicts and external conflicts and FDI inflows 
(Busse and Hefeker 2007). No study in the capital flows literature to the best of our knowledge, 
however, has attempted to identify the social cohesion-related institutions. 
We will therefore adopt Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to transform the numerous 
ICRG correlated political risk institutions into a smaller number of principal components. As 
Norman and Streiner (2008) explain, the idea of PCA is to explain the variance among a number 
of variables in terms of orthogonal principal components. In doing so, PCA obtains a series of 
linear combinations of variables which define each component, with the number of linear 
combinations or components equal to the number of variables, or institutions in this paper.
13
 A 
principal component   takes the following form: 
 
                          (2) 
 
where   is a variable,   is the weight,   is variable indicator with        . The weight   has 
two subscripts, with the first one indicating the principal component, and the second one 
                                                                                                                                                                             
institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy. It tends to minimize the impact of government change 
shocks on policy revisions. The maximum score is 4. 
13
 See Norman and Streiner (2008) page 198. 
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indicating the variable it relates to. The  ’s for the principal components are chosen in such a 
way that sequentially expresses the largest amount of variance in the sample. For example for the 
first principal component,  ’s express the largest amount of variance in the sample, while for the 
second component ’s are derived in such a way that the second component is uncorrelated to the 
first one and expresses the next largest amount of variance. 
One criterion for choosing among the derived principal components is the Kaiser criterion. 
According to this criterion, principal components with eignevalues exceeding 1 are selected. In 
interpreting the principal components, we will adopt and compare the results of orthogonal 
(Varimax) and oblique (Promax) rotation methods to ensure robustness of the identified principal 
components. 
 
b. Endogeneity, Causes, and Estimation 
The second issue is to address potential endogeneity, defined as the correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the error term. The presence of endogeneity results in inconsistent 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates.  
Endogeneity may result from the presence of time-invariant, unobservable country-specific 
and/or time-specific effects, simultaneity, and variable omission. The presence of unobservable 
effects results in a correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term. Either fixed 
or random effects models can be adopted depending on the Hausman specification test statistics. 
We will report both country, and country and time fixed effects estimation results.  
Dynamic panel fixed effects estimation could suffer from the Hurwicz or Nickell problem of 
downward coefficient bias when the time dimension of the panel is very short.
14
 With T=29 and 
N=52, the downward bias may not be strong. Robustness of results will be checked using system 
GMM estimation methodology. System GMM allows us to address enedogeneity more generally.  
Another potential source of endogeneity is reverse causality between FDI inflows and the 
explanatory variables including the social cohesion-related institutions.
15
 FDI inflows may 
enhance growth, stimulate trade and financial development, and contribute to the development of 
infrastructure. FDI inflows may improve social and economic conditions in society through 
reduction in unemployment and poverty and thus increase growth and enhance government 
stability. They may also raise the opportunity costs of external conflicts and thus reduce the 
likelihood of involvement in such conflicts. Granger causality tests will be used to detect reverse 
causality.  
System, as opposed to difference, GMM estimation is used because difference GMM suffers 
weak instrument problem, affecting its asymptotic properties (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell 
and Bond 1998), and consequently both point estimates and hypothesis tests become 
unreliable.
16,17
 For system GMM, lagged differences of explanatory variables are used as 
instruments, assuming the absence of serial correlation in the error term, and between these 
instruments and the error term. We use the Arellano-Bond test to test the lack of second-order 
serial correlation and the Hansen/Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions to test for 
instrument validity.  
                                                          
14
 See Burger et al (2013) for a discussion of this issue in the context of political instability and greenfield 
FDI in the MENA region. 
15
 Endogeneity could also result from the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error 
term. System GMM estimation methodology accounts generally for endogeneity.   
16
 For recent applications of GMM estimators see for example Che et al (2012), Sen et al (2007), and Rioja 
and Valev (2004).  
17
 The lagged levels of the explanatory variables are used as instruments for the differenced explanatory 
variables on the conditions that the error term of the differenced equation is not serially correlated and that 
the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. 
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With the growth in time dimension (T=29), instrument proliferation can become an issue. 
The Hansen instrument orthogonality test under system GMM might suffer notable size 
distortion, which results in poor detection of orthogonality violation (Che et al 2013). To 
overcome this problem and also mitigate the finite sample bias, Roodman (2009) suggests 
collapsing the instruments, which we follow in this paper.
18
 In addition to adopting system GMM 
estimation methodology to deal with endogeneity, we will also adopt an instrumental variables 
approach accounting for fixed (country) effects for robustness of results. 
 
c. Presence of Unit Root   
The third issue is to detect potential unit root process, which results in spurious regressions. 
We use a battery of panel unit root tests.
19
 The first test is the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) unit root 
test, which assumes identical first-order autoregressive coefficients across countries. The test 
involves the following regression equation: 
  
                   
 
              (3) 
 
The subscripts i and t are country and time indicators with i=1,...,N and t=1,...,T. The null 
hypothesis of the LLC unit root test is H0:             against the alternative hypothesis H1: 
               . We also use the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) W-stat and the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller - Fisher Chi-squared tests, which allow the first-order autoregressive 
coefficients to vary across countries under the alternative hypothesis H1:        .  
 
d. Logarithmic Treatment of Negative and Zero Values 
The fourth issue is the logarithmic transformation of negative and zero values of the 
dependent and explanatory variables. Similar to Mina (2012), Kerner (2009), Neumayer and 
Spess (2005), and Blonigen and Davies (2004), in dealing with negative FDI values, we take the 
negative of the log of the absolute value. As for zero FDI values, we add one thousandth of one 
percentage point before taking the log, while for the social cohesion-related institutions, we add 
one tenth. Finally, due to the inclusion of financial development variable (FINANCE) in the 
empirical model, the sample of middle income countries on which value of stocks traded data are 
available is reduced from 70 originally to 52.
20
  
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
a. Identification of Social Cohesion Component and Institutions 
In our sample of middle income countries, the highest average performance on ICRG 
political risk components is on external conflicts, followed by religion in politics, internal 
conflicts, ethnic tensions and government stability while the lowest is on corruption (Table 1).
21
 
In other words, the sample middle income countries highest performance is on their involvement 
in external conflicts, while their lowest performance was on corruption. The sample countries 
                                                          
18
 Though it is interesting to compare estimation results under (non-collapsed instruments) system and 
difference GMM, we have decided for paper brevity not to include estimation results in this paper. 
19
 The treatment of endogeneity and unit-root process issues is similar to Mina (2012). 
20
 Excluded middle income countries are Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cameroon, Congo 
Republic, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Honduras, Iraq, Libya, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sudan, 
Suriname, Syria, and Yemen. 
21
 We exclude the socioeconomic conditions indicator since it assesses socioeconomic pressures in society 
resulting from unemployment, consumer confidence, and poverty.  
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show highest performance (mean-scaled) variation on the degree of military involvement in 
politics. 
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  
Obs. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Max Min Index 
Score 
Mean 
(%) 
BQ 1021 2.0 0.7 4.0 0.0 4 50.7 
C 1021 2.5 0.9 5.0 0.0 6 42.2 
DA 1021 3.9 1.3 6.0 0.0 6 65.0 
ET 1021 4.0 1.4 6.0 0.0 6 66.6 
EC 1021 10.1 1.5 12.0 2.6 12 84.4 
GS 1021 8.0 1.9 12.0 1.0 12 66.5 
IC 1021 8.8 2.0 12.0 0.0 12 73.6 
IP 1021 7.4 2.0 11.5 1.3 12 62.0 
LO 1021 3.4 1.1 6.0 0.0 6 56.2 
MP 1021 3.7 1.5 6.0 0.0 6 61.9 
RP 1021 4.5 1.5 6.0 0.5 6 74.9 
SC 1021 5.3 1.6 10.0 1.0 12 43.8 
Notes: BQ: bureaucracy quality. C: Corruption. DA: democratic accountability. ET: 
ethnic tensions. EC: external conflict. GS: government stability. IC: internal conflict. IP: 
investment profile. LO: law and order. MP: military in politics. RP: religion in politics. 
SC: Socioeconomic conditions. 
 
Identifying correlation coefficients of 0.3 and above in the correlation matrix is the basic 
requirement for a successful factor extraction, as Norman and Streiner (2008) point out based on 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). The correlation coefficients matrix for the different ICRG 
institutions is presented in table 2. Among those institutions we expect to be related to social 
cohesion, there is reasonable correlation between internal conflict and law and order (0.57), 
military in politics (0.50), religion in politics (0.37), ethnic tensions (0.47) and external conflict 
(0.45). This may suggest the formulation of a “social cohesion” component. 
  
TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix for Institutions Variables 
 
 BQ C DA ET EC GS IC IP LO MP RP SC 
BQ 1.000            
C 0.342 1.000           
DA 0.251 0.163 1.000          
ET 0.100 0.135 0.022 1.000         
EC 0.046 0.213 0.105 0.244 1.000        
GS 0.006 -0.060 -0.124 0.241 0.128 1.000       
IC 0.120 0.150 0.138 0.473 0.452 0.342 1.000      
IP 0.189 -0.015 0.276 0.187 0.220 0.408 0.325 1.000     
LO 0.086 0.214 0.022 0.297 0.180 0.349 0.571 0.210 1.000    
MP 0.275 0.240 0.400 0.281 0.277 0.143 0.495 0.390 0.349 1.000   
RP 0.087 0.170 0.163 0.345 0.386 0.126 0.369 0.240 0.118 0.381 1.000  
SC 0.365 0.203 0.004 0.129 0.136 -0.013 0.224 0.257 0.218 0.183 0.115 1.000 
Notes: BQ: bureaucracy quality. C: Corruption. DA: democratic accountability. ET: ethnic tensions. EC: external conflict. GS: government 
stability. IC: internal conflict. IP: investment profile. LO: law and order. MP: military in politics. RP: religion in politics. SC: 
socioeconomic conditions. 
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TABLE 3 
Principal Component Analysis of Institutions 
 
 Initial Eigenvalues Components 
Comp Total 
% 
Variance 
% 
Cumulative 
 Non-Rotated  Orthogonally Rotated*  Obliquely Rotated** 
    
 
1 2 3 4 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
1 2 3 4 
1 3.40 30.92 30.92 IC 0.80 -0.23 -0.12 0.03 RP 0.77 0.00 0.23 -0.01 RP 0.77 0.19 0.31 0.13 
2 1.55 14.10 45.02 MP 0.73 0.26 0.16 -0.05 EC 0.75 0.07 0.07 0.05 EC 0.76 0.24 0.17 0.17 
3 1.15 10.47 55.49 LO 0.60 -0.29 -0.10 0.48 ET 0.53 0.41 -0.05 0.13 ET 0.60 0.51 0.07 0.22 
4 1.07 9.73 65.22 ET 0.58 -0.23 -0.27 -0.02 GS 0.01 0.79 0.11 -0.24 GS 0.14 0.77 0.18 -0.20 
5 0.81 7.33 72.55 RP 0.58 0.06 -0.21 -0.51 LO 0.16 0.74 -0.03 0.32 LO 0.32 0.76 0.09 0.36 
6 0.75 6.82 79.37 EC 0.56 -0.02 -0.33 -0.39 IC 0.56 0.59 0.15 0.16 IC 0.68 0.72 0.29 0.27 
7 0.59 5.33 84.69 DA 0.35 0.62 0.38 -0.20 DA 0.12 -0.22 0.76 0.20 DA 0.17 -0.09 0.76 0.27 
8 0.54 4.92 89.62 GS 0.43 -0.59 0.33 0.22 IP 0.11 0.44 0.70 -0.20 IP 0.23 0.52 0.74 -0.11 
9 0.44 3.99 93.61 BQ 0.33 0.56 0.12 0.43 MP 0.40 0.25 0.57 0.28 MP 0.52 0.41 0.66 0.39 
10 0.41 3.68 97.29 C 0.36 0.49 -0.46 0.38 C 0.21 0.00 -0.02 0.82 C 0.29 0.07 0.06 0.84 
11 0.30 2.71 100.00 IP 0.57 -0.07 0.63 -0.10 BQ -0.13 0.08 0.42 0.65 BQ 0.00 0.12 0.46 0.65 
Notes: *Orthogonal rotation using the Varimax method. **Oblique rotation using the Promax method.  
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Table 3 shows the 11 principal components obtained, with four components 
having eigenvalues exceeding 1 according to the Kaiser criterion and explaining more 
than 65 percent of the total variance of the data. The first component alone explains 
about one third of the variance. The factor loadings of the first component show 
highest correlation (absolute value of about 0.6) with internal conflict, military in 
politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, religion in politics and external conflict. The 
factor loadings of the second component show highest correlation with democratic 
accountability, government stability, and bureaucracy quality. The factor loadings of 
the third component show highest correlation with investment profile. For the fourth 
component, religion in politics, law and order, and bureaucracy quality have the 
highest correlation though the correlation coefficients are about 0.5.  
 To identify institutions that are possibly associated with social cohesion, we 
need to interpret the factors. Norman and Streiner (2008) point out that the factor 
loadings (component) matrix should satisfy four conditions: a) variance should be 
evenly distributed across retained factors; b) each variable should load on only one 
factor; c) factor loadings should be close to 1 or zero; and d) factors should be unipolar 
(either positive or negative). These four conditions ease the interpretation of the factor 
analysis results and create structural simplicity. 
Assessing these four conditions in light of table 3, the retained factors account 
for 0.31, 0.14, 0.10 and 0.10 of the variance, respectively. This may not be, in our 
opinion, an extremely uneven distribution. Seven of the 11 institutions have high factor 
loadings (of about 0.6) on the first factor. However, only two of the seven institutions 
(IP and LO) load on other factors (the second and fourth, respectively). The third and 
fourth conditions are to some extent violated with factor loadings being in the middle 
range of 0.5 (especially for the first factor) and with ten institutions carrying positive 
and negative loadings. Norman and Streiner (2008) argue nonetheless that, “From a 
mathematical viewpoint, nothing is wrong with most of the variance being in one 
factor, or with factorial complexity, or with loadings in the middle range, or with 
bipolar factors. However, it is easiest to interpret the results of a factor analysis if we 
can meet these criteria and aim for structural simplicity. This is what rotating the 
factors tries to do.” (page 202).  
Thus our next step is to rotate the extracted factors.  For comparison purposes 
and robustness, we will adopt orthogonal and oblique rotation approaches, using the 
Varimax and Promax respectively. The orthogonal rotation approach assumes no 
correlation among the principal factors, while the oblique rotation does not.
22
 Table 3 
reports the rotated factors. 
The Varimax method reports religion in politics, external conflict, internal 
conflict displaying the highest factor loadings (of about 0.60) (followed by ethnic 
tensions if the cut off loading is slightly lowered to 0.50). The Promax method reports 
the same institutions but with higher factors loadings. 
 Both methods report government stability, law and order, and internal conflict 
having the highest factor loadings of the second component. The factor loadings of the 
third component show highest correlation for democratic accountability, investment 
profile, and military in politics under both methods. For the fourth component, 
corruption and bureaucracy quality have the highest correlation under both methods.   
 One may interpret the first component as social cohesion: conflicts, ethnic 
tensions, and the manipulation of religion to serve politics are all factors that reduce 
the attachment and steadfastness of society. The second component may be interpreted 
                                                          
22
 Varimax minimizes the number of variables, which have high loadings on each factor, and 
thus helps simplify factor interpretation. 
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as stability and order. Internal conflicts play an important role in the social cohesion 
and stability of society. The third component may be interpreted as the respect of rights 
and liberties, while the fourth component may be interpreted as the quality of public 
administration. Guided by these results, we will report the estimation results for the 
four identified institutions and the social cohesion principal component in examining 
the influence of social cohesion on FDI flows.  
   
b. Regional and Country Performance 
The regional performance on of the four social cohesion-related institutions is 
provided in table 4. Latin American and Caribbean countries were the highest 
performers on the role of religion in politics, East Asian and Pacific on external 
conflict, European and Central Asian on internal conflict, and the Middle Eastern and 
North African countries on ethnic tensions. In contrast, the South Asian countries were 
the least performers on all four institutions. For the total sample, the highest 
performance was on external conflict, followed by ethnic tensions, internal conflict, 
and lastly by religion in politics. 
Table 5 provides the empirical model variable means. As the table shows, 
Mongolia (Iran) had the highest (lowest) average FDI inflows relative to GDP, while 
China (Guyana) had the largest (smallest) market size. Armenia (Guyana) had the 
highest (lowest) market potential. Guyana (Brazil) was the most (least) open economy 
(relative to its market size). Malaysia (Armenia) was the most (least) financially 
developed. Serbia (Nigeria) was the most (least) developed infrastructure-wise. As for 
the social cohesion-related variables, Bolivia, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Moldova, Namibia, Paraguay (Pakistan) had the highest (lowest) religion in 
politics average. Guatemala (Lebanon) had the highest (lowest) external conflict 
average. Botswana (Sri Lanka) had the highest (lowest) internal conflict average, while 
Argentina, Costa Rica, and El Salvador (Sri Lanka) had the highest (lowest) ethnic 
tensions average. 
 
c. Panel Unit Roots and Granger Causality 
We report the panel unit root test results in table 6. Results of the three tests – 
LLM, IPS, and ADF - indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of presence of unit root 
process for FDI, GROWTH, TRADE, FINANCE, INFRASTRUCTURE and 
COHESION. The variables are stationary in the level.
23
   
Although reverse causality between FDI and the social cohesion-related 
institutions is an initial concern, Granger causality test statistics, shown in table 7, 
indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of FDI not causing all the explanatory 
variables except FINANCE and INFRASTRUCTURE. Accordingly we included them 
in addition to the dependent and lagged dependent variable among the GMM variables 
in Stata’s two-step system GMM estimation.  
 
d. Estimation Results 
Fixed effects estimation results, accounting for unobservable country, and 
country and time effects, are presented in tables 8 and 9. The first four columns 
correspond to the identified individual social cohesion-related institutions: religion in 
                                                          
23
 Panel unit root tests for (log) nominal GDP indicated that the null hypothesis of presence of 
unit root process could not be rejected. Panel unit root tests for the first difference of (log) 
nominal GDP indicated stationarity. However, the first difference of (log) nominal GDP is the 
nominal GDP growth rate. The real GDP growth rate (GROWTH) is included in the empirical 
model. 
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politics, internal conflict, external conflict, and ethnic tensions. The last two columns 
report the results for the Varimax and Promax principal components. The R-squared 
for the estimated country-effects models suggest the estimated models explain nearly 
one third of the variation in the dependent variable. The explanatory power of the 
model nearly doubles when the time effects are included as well.  The F tests indicate 
the joint significance of the explanatory variables.  
Results show that among the four social cohesion-related institutions, religion 
in politics has a positive and statistically significant influence on FDI flows at the one 
percent level. A one percentage point improvement in the role religion in politics, i.e. 
less religion in politics,  
 
TABLE 4 
Social Cohesion-Related Institutional Performance  
(by Region) 
 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Max Min Index Score Mean (%) 
 
East Asia and Pacific 
RP 161 3.883 1.373 6.0 1.0 6 64.7 
EC 161 10.656 1.155 12.0 6.0 12 88.8 
IC 161 9.216 1.828 12.0 4.0 12 76.8 
ET 161 3.698 1.282 5.5 1.0 6 61.6 
 
Europe and Central Asia 
RP 167 4.933 0.636 6.0 3.0 6 82.2 
EC 167 9.853 1.289 12.0 6.9 12 82.1 
IC 167 9.511 1.529 12.0 4.3 12 79.3 
ET 167 3.699 1.111 6.0 1.7 6 61.6 
 
Latin America and Caribbean 
RP 330 5.507 0.579 6.0 4.0 6 91.8 
EC 330 10.533 1.171 12.0 7.5 12 87.8 
IC 330 8.702 1.849 12.0 2.8 12 72.5 
ET 330 4.648 1.172 6.0 2.0 6 77.5 
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Middle East and North Africa 
RP 135 3.314 1.125 5.5 2.0 6 55.2 
EC 135 9.321 1.813 12.0 2.6 12 77.7 
IC 135 8.930 1.695 12.0 4.6 12 74.4 
ET 135 4.770 0.824 6.0 2.8 6 79.5 
 
South Asia 
RP 75 2.175 1.083 4.0 1.0 6 36.2 
EC 75 8.749 2.212 12.0 4.0 12 72.9 
IC 75 6.197 2.718 10.8 0.0 12 51.6 
ET 75 1.998 1.318 5.0 0.0 6 33.3 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
RP 153 4.645 1.601 6.0 0.5 6 77.4 
EC 153 10.383 1.241 12.0 5.7 12 86.5 
IC 153 9.213 1.822 12.0 4.4 12 76.8 
ET 153 3.524 1.202 5.0 0.7 6 58.7 
 
Total 
RP 1021 3.996 1.380 6.0 0.0 6 66.6 
EC 1021 10.127 1.511 12.0 2.6 12 84.4 
IC 1021 8.838 2.013 12.0 0.0 12 73.6 
ET 1021 4.493 1.452 6.0 0.5 6 74.9 
Notes: RP: religion in politics. EC: external conflict. IC: internal conflict. ET: 
ethnic tensions.  
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TABLE 5 
Period Means (1984-2012) 
 
 Country FDI GROWTH TRADE FINANCE INFRASTRUCTURE RP EC IC ET 
1 Argentina 2.3 2.9 29.1 3.1 18.9 5.8 10.5 9.9 6.0 
2 Armenia 6.0 11.2 68.9 0.0 19.0 5.0 7.4 8.9 5.5 
3 Bolivia 5.4 3.9 60.8 0.1 6.7 6.0 10.4 8.4 3.0 
4 Botswana 1.7 4.5 92.4 0.8 6.1 5.0 11.0 11.0 4.6 
5 Brazil 2.0 2.6 21.4 19.2 15.0 5.8 11.3 9.4 3.9 
6 Bulgaria 9.0 2.7 116.9 1.9 32.6 5.1 10.2 10.8 4.7 
7 Chile 5.8 5.4 63.7 11.5 16.5 5.5 10.4 9.2 5.2 
8 China 3.2 10.3 49.0 58.0 14.4 5.2 10.1 10.3 4.3 
9 Colombia 2.6 3.7 35.2 2.6 14.0 4.8 9.3 5.4 5.2 
10 Costa Rica 4.2 4.3 88.8 0.5 25.2 5.0 10.7 10.5 6.0 
11 Cote d'Ivoire 1.7 1.7 74.1 0.3 1.2 4.4 9.5 8.4 2.7 
12 Ecuador 2.0 3.4 53.7 0.4 10.8 5.0 9.8 8.3 3.6 
13 Egypt 2.6 4.5 51.4 11.1 8.3 2.5 9.9 8.0 5.1 
14 El Salvador 2.2 2.2 67.9 0.4 12.8 6.0 11.0 9.5 6.0 
15 Ghana 3.1 5.8 82.9 0.4 1.0 6.0 11.6 9.2 2.9 
  
 Country FDI GROWTH TRADE FINANCE INFRASTRUCTURE RP EC IC ET 
16 Guatemala 1.4 4.3 42.8 0.0 3.8 6.0 12.0 9.8 3.8 
17 Guyana 5.8 0.6 198.3 0.1 15.4 6.0 9.6 9.3 2.0 
18 India 1.0 6.5 30.6 40.5 2.3 2.3 8.6 7.0 2.1 
19 Indonesia 0.9 5.4 56.3 10.8 5.3 2.2 10.6 7.4 2.2 
20 Iran 0.7 3.9 44.3 2.7 21.0 2.0 7.9 9.2 4.5 
21 Jamaica 4.3 1.6 96.6 2.5 12.1 6.0 11.8 9.3 4.8 
22 Jordan 5.4 4.3 125.2 36.1 9.3 3.4 10.0 9.0 4.5 
23 Kazakhstan 8.3 6.8 86.3 1.8 18.0 4.8 11.0 10.5 5.0 
24 Latvia 4.5 4.7 101.2 0.8 28.1 5.0 10.6 10.6 3.2 
25 Lebanon 10.7 3.7 63.6 2.5 17.3 2.6 6.4 8.0 5.0 
26 Lithuania 3.5 4.5 115.1 1.8 26.1 5.4 10.1 10.7 3.8 
27 Malaysia 4.3 6.3 180.2 63.0 15.5 3.6 10.9 10.4 3.5 
28 Mexico 2.3 2.9 48.6 8.1 12.7 5.7 10.8 9.0 4.0 
29 Moldova 5.7 2.4 130.2 1.8 20.9 6.0 10.0 9.1 3.4 
30 Mongolia 11.9 6.4 114.7 0.5 5.6 5.0 11.7 10.9 5.0 
31 Morocco 2.2 4.1 64.4 7.2 5.2 4.1 9.7 8.8 4.5 
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 Country FDI GROWTH TRADE FINANCE INFRASTRUCTURE RP EC IC ET 
32 Namibia 4.7 4.5 96.7 0.3 6.1 6.0 10.8 10.9 4.7 
33 Nigeria 3.9 6.0 62.9 1.6 0.5 1.9 9.9 7.3 2.5 
34 Pakistan 1.1 4.2 34.3 28.0 2.2 1.1 8.0 6.9 2.7 
35 Panama 6.7 6.0 158.0 0.5 13.7 5.0 10.3 9.6 5.0 
36 Papua New Guinea 1.0 4.3 122.8 0.3 1.2 5.0 10.0 9.6 2.0 
37 Paraguay 1.3 2.9 98.4 0.1 5.2 6.0 11.2 8.3 5.0 
38 Peru 3.2 3.4 37.4 3.3 6.8 5.7 9.7 6.4 2.8 
39 Philippines 1.5 4.1 82.1 11.7 3.0 3.2 11.0 7.5 4.1 
40 Romania 3.7 2.8 70.0 1.4 18.5 4.9 11.2 10.3 4.1 
41 Russia 2.0 2.6 55.3 23.5 25.1 5.1 9.6 8.4 2.7 
42 Serbia 4.9 2.1 72.1 1.7 34.6 5.0 8.7 9.3 3.0 
43 South Africa 1.1 2.6 52.3 56.7 9.6 5.1 10.0 8.5 3.2 
44 Sri Lanka 1.2 5.2 71.6 2.6 6.1 3.2 9.6 4.7 1.2 
45 Thailand 2.8 5.3 111.4 42.4 7.5 4.1 9.7 8.8 3.9 
46 Tunisia 3.0 4.1 91.3 1.5 8.8 4.7 10.6 10.3 5.0 
47 Turkey 1.0 4.0 44.7 30.1 22.7 3.9 8.8 7.4 2.3 
  
 Country FDI GROWTH TRADE FINANCE INFRASTRUCTURE RP EC IC ET 
48 Ukraine 4.0 3.6 104.7 0.9 25.0 5.2 10.2 9.7 4.1 
49 Uruguay 3.1 3.6 47.9 0.0 26.1 5.0 11.2 9.4 6.0 
50 Venezuela 2.0 2.4 51.1 1.4 13.2 5.0 9.9 8.9 5.0 
51 Vietnam 6.2 6.5 142.3 6.6 13.1 4.2 11.5 10.2 4.6 
52 Zambia 6.2 5.0 71.4 0.4 0.8 4.9 10.2 10.2 5.0 
           
 Total 3.4 4.3 75.0 11.6 12.1 4.5 10.1 8.8 4.0 
Notes: RP: Religion in politics. EC: External conflict. IC: Internal conflict. ET: Ethnic tensions. 
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TABLE 6 
Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
Variable LLC IPS ADF 
FDI 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (52, 996) (51, 963) (52, 966) 
MARKET 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (52, 976) (51, 973) (52, 976) 
D.MARKET 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (51, 924) (51, 924) (51, 924) 
GROWTH 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (52, 965) (51, 957) (52, 960) 
TRADE 0.003 0.009 0.003 
 (51, 947) (49, 941) (51, 947) 
FINANCE 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (52, 958) (51, 955) (52, 958) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (52, 943) (51,940) (52, 943) 
COHESION    
RP 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (31,632) (31,632) (31,632) 
EC 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (48,901) (48,901) (48,901) 
IC 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (52,922) (52,919) (52,922) 
ET 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (34,688) (34,688) (34,688) 
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Notes: Statistics are based on full sample of middle income countries. LLC, IPS, and ADF 
are Levin, Lin & Chu (t* test), Im, Pesaran and Shin (W-stat), and Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(Fisher Chi-square) tests. Panel unit root tests are conducted on variables in log forms except 
for GROWTH. Figures in parentheses are number of countries and observations.  
 
TABLE 7 
Granger Causality Test Statistics 
 
 Obs. F-Statistic Prob.  
H0: Y does not Granger cause X    
GROWTH  912  1.101 0.333 
TRADE  899  0.230 0.794 
FINANCE  921  8.375 0.000 
INFRASTRUCTURE  924  7.708 0.001 
COHESION    
RP  915  0.118 0.889 
EC  915  0.299 0.742 
IC  915  1.110 0.330 
ET  915  0.661 0.516 
    
H0: X does not Granger cause Y    
GROWTH  912  5.860 0.003 
TRADE  899  8.610 0.000 
FINANCE  921  4.024 0.018 
INFRASTRUCTURE  924  3.080 0.047 
COHESION    
RP  915  5.592 0.004 
EC  915  4.743 0.009 
IC  915  4.731 0.009 
ET  915  7.829 0.000 
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Notes: “H0: Y does not Granger-cause X” is the null hypothesis that the 
dependent variable does not Granger cause the explanatory variable. “H0: X 
does not Granger cause Y” is the null hypothesis that the explanatory variable 
does not Granger-cause the dependent variable. Test is based on 2 lags. 
increases FDI flows to middle income countries by about one third percentage point. 
The remaining three institutions are statistically insignificant. The social cohesion 
principal components, regardless of the rotation method, are statistically insignificant.  
Results for the control variables show that trade openness and financial 
development have positive and statistically significant influence on FDI flows. The 
positive influence of market potential is only marginally significant in the fixed 
country effects model specification. The positive coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable suggests persistence of FDI flows.  
Besides the endogeneity arising from unobservable country and time effects, 
IV and two-step system GMM estimates account for endogeneity arising from reverse 
causality, in particular from FDI flows to FINANCE and INFRASTRUCTURE. The 
results are reported in tables 10 and 11. The Wald test indicates joint significance of 
the explanatory variables at the 1 percent level for all specifications. For the system 
GMM estimation, we fail to reject the null hypotheses of second-order serial 
correlation of error term and over-identifying restrictions. Accordingly the obtained 
estimates are consistent. 
 
Both estimation methodologies confirm the fixed effects coefficient estimates. 
The influence of the role of religion in politics is positive and statistically significant 
though higher. IV and system GMM estimates show that an improvement of religion in 
politics by one percentage point increases FDI inflows by 0.4 and 0.5 percentage 
points, respectively. In addition to the influence of religion in politics, system GMM 
estimates show a positive and statistically significant coefficient of ethnic tensions of 
about the same magnitude. Therefore less religion in politics and less ethnic tensions 
have a positive influence on FDI inflows to middle income countries. 
The influence of the extracted social cohesion component on FDI flows has 
been statistically insignificant regardless of the estimation methodology. The exception 
is the principal component obtained using oblique (Promax) rotation and system GMM 
estimation methodology, shown in table 11. Such influence is negative and statistically 
significant at the one percent level: An improvement in social cohesion by one 
percentage point reduces FDI inflows by nearly one tenth of a percentage point. This 
result is implausible, however, in light of the positive estimates of the four major social 
cohesion institutions. The results of a larger country sample can provide us guidance 
on the robustness of this estimate.  
 Compared to the influence of trade openness under the fixed effects estimation 
methodology, the influence of trade openness stretches from nearly 0.5 under IV 
estimation to 0.7-0.9 under system GMM estimation. The positive influence of trade 
openness on FDI flows is robust to estimation methodology unlike any other control 
variables. 
 
e. Further Robustness Checks 
In addition to the implicit robustness checks rendered through the different 
estimation methodologies, we also re-examine the results using a larger country sample 
covering the union of ICRG and WDI data. Tables 12 and 13 provide the fixed effects 
estimation results for the larger country sample, while table 14 and 15 provide those 
for the IV and system GMM estimation.  
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TABLE 8 
Social Cohesion and FDI Flows 
Dependent Variable: FDI Flows % GDP (log) 
(Fixed Country Effects) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES RP EC IC ET Varimax Promax 
L.FDI 0.413a 0.423a 0.423a 0.422a 0.422a 0.420a 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
GROWTH 0.014c 0.014c 0.013c 0.014c 0.014c 0.014c 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
TRADE 0.483a 0.515a 0.534a 0.513a 0.511a 0.506a 
 (0.137) (0.141) (0.145) (0.144) (0.140) (0.140) 
FINANCE 0.094a 0.100a 0.099a 0.100a 0.101a 0.100a 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 0.103 0.059 0.038 0.061 0.061 0.065 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.067) (0.062) (0.059) (0.058) 
COHESION 0.346a 0.05 0.092 0.004 -0.007 -0.018 
 (0.115) (0.229) (0.086) (0.096) (0.019) (0.020) 
Constant -2.351a -2.029b -2.145a -1.913a -1.899a -1.890a 
 (0.574) (0.803) (0.628) (0.617) (0.551) (0.552) 
       
Observations 978 978 978 978 978 978 
R-squared 0.338 0.332 0.333 0.332 0.332 0.333 
Number of countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. All variables are in log form except GROWTH. RP, EC, IC, and ET are 
religion in politics, external conflict, internal conflict, and ethnic tensions, respectively. 
Varimax and Promax are the social cohesion principal components using the orthogonal 
and oblique rotation methods, respectively. Figures for F test are p values.  
  
24 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
TABLE 9 
Social Cohesion and FDI Flows 
Dependent Variable: FDI Flows % GDP (log) 
(Fixed Country and Time Effects) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES RP EC IC ET Varimax Promax 
L.FDI 0.395a 0.404a 0.403a 0.404a 0.404a 0.403a 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
GROWTH 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
TRADE 0.278c 0.306b 0.327b 0.301b 0.300b 0.297b 
 (0.148) (0.15) (0.153) (0.153) (0.15) (0.15) 
FINANCE 0.072a 0.073a 0.073a 0.073a 0.073a 0.073a 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
INFRASTRUCTURE -0.085 -0.151 -0.179c -0.148 -0.147 -0.145 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.097) (0.093) (0.091) (0.091) 
COHESION 0.331a 0.08 0.122 0.003 -0.005 -0.014 
 (0.117) (0.203) (0.081) (0.095) (0.018) (0.020) 
Constant -0.841 -1.595 -1.770c -1.722c -1.704b -1.692b 
 (0.709) (1.031) (0.925) (0.893) (0.861) (0.860) 
       
Observations 978 978 978 978 978 978 
R-squared 0.625 0.623 0.623 0.622 0.623 0.623 
Number of countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. All variables are in log form except GROWTH. RP, EC, IC, and ET are 
religion in politics, external conflict, internal conflict, and ethnic tensions, respectively. 
Varimax and Promax are the social cohesion principal components using the orthogonal 
and oblique rotation methods, respectively. Figures for F test are p values.  
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TABLE 10 
Social Cohesion and FDI Flows 
Dependent Variable: FDI Flows % GDP (log) 
(IV Fixed Effects Estimation) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES RP EC IC ET Varimax Promax 
L.FDI 0.457a 0.468a 0.466a 0.467a 0.466a 0.463a 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
GROWTH 0.015b 0.014b 0.014b 0.014b 0.015b 0.015b 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
TRADE 0.423a 0.466a 0.472a 0.462a 0.457a 0.446a 
  (0.148) (0.149) (0.150) (0.149) (0.148) (0.148) 
FINANCE 0.055 0.073 0.074 0.072 0.073 0.071 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 0.140c 0.066 0.053 0.068 0.071 0.076 
  (0.072) (0.069) (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
COHESION 0.407a 0.191 0.08 0.047 0.01 -0.031 
  (0.119) (0.206) (0.086) (0.087) (0.019) (0.02) 
Constant -2.270a -2.179a -1.906a -1.789a -1.713a -1.678a 
  (0.616) (0.792) (0.639) (0.620) (0.596) (0.595) 
              
Observations 869 869 869 869 869 869 
Number of countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 
R-squared 0.357 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.351 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. RP, EC, IC, ET, and PC are religion in politics, external conflict, internal 
conflict, ethnic tensions, and the social cohesion principal component, respectively. IVs 
for FINANCE and INFRASTRUCTURE are L2.FINANCE, L1.INFRASTSTUCTURE, 
and L2.INFRASTRUCTURE. Figures for Wald test are p values. 
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TABLE 11 
Social Cohesion and FDI Flows 
Dependent Variable: FDI Flows % GDP (log)  
(Two-step System GMM Estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES RP EC IC ET Varimax Promax 
L.FDI 0.052 0.038 0.041 0.057 0.042 0.029 
 (0.068) (0.07) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) (0.065) 
GROWTH 0.032b 0.031a 0.028b 0.029b 0.034a 0.032a 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
TRADE 0.775a 0.725a 0.761a 0.855a 0.737a 0.707a 
 (0.287) (0.163) (0.257) (0.218) (0.266) (0.169) 
FINANCE 0.006 -0.024 -0.016 0.008 -0.023 -0.019 
 (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 0.066 0.194b 0.172c 0.099 0.169 0.128 
 (0.108) (0.097) (0.100) (0.085) (0.106) (0.098) 
COHESION 0.495b 0.217 0.34 0.478b 0.009 -0.087a 
 (0.246) (0.600) (0.212) (0.187) (0.025) (0.027) 
Constant -3.392a -3.181b -3.541b -3.701a -2.703b -2.486a 
 (1.277) (1.518) (1.421) (1.062) (1.099) (0.760) 
       
Observations 813 813 813 813 813 813 
Number of countries 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of instruments 113 113 113 113 113 113 
A-B (AR2) test 0.443 0.494 0.494 0.493 0.467 0.459 
Hansen test 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. RP, EC, IC, ET, and PC are religion in politics, external conflict, internal 
conflict, ethnic tensions, and the social cohesion principal component, respectively. 
GMM variables are FDI, FINANCE and INFRASTRUCTURE. IV variables are 
GROWTH, TRADE, L2.FINANCE, L3.FINANCE, L1.INFRASTSTUCTURE, 
L2.INFRASTRUCTURE, COHESION, and time dummies. Instruments are collapsed. 
Figures for Wald, A-B(AR2) and Hansen tests are p values. 
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TABLE 12 
Social Cohesion and FDI Flows: Robustness Check using Full Sample 
Dependent Variable: FDI Flows % GDP (log) 
(Fixed Country Effects) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RP EC IC ET Varimax Promax 
L.FDI 0.284a 0.289a 0.288a 0.289a 0.285a 0.287a 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
GROWTH 0.015b 0.015b 0.015b 0.016b 0.016b 0.016b 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
TRADE 0.735a 0.755a 0.759a 0.754a 0.749a 0.732a 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.152) (0.151) (0.146) (0.148) 
FINANCE 0.166a 0.169a 0.169a 0.167a 0.168a 0.169a 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 0.112c 0.069 0.055 0.068 0.097c 0.090 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) 
COHESION 0.409a 0.265 0.122 0.14 0.048b 0.019 
 (0.123) (0.181) (0.087) (0.087) (0.019) (0.015) 
Constant -3.843a -3.825a -3.458a -3.395a -3.265a -3.171a 
 (0.645) (0.740) (0.666) (0.643) (0.594) (0.599) 
       
Observations 1,992 1,992 1,992 1,992 1,992 1,992 
R-squared 0.248 0.245 0.244 0.245 0.247 0.244 
Number of countries 101 101 101 101 101 101 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. All variables are in log form except GROWTH. RP, EC, IC, and ET are 
religion in politics, external conflict, internal conflict, and ethnic tensions, respectively. 
Varimax and Promax are the social cohesion principal components using the orthogonal 
and oblique rotation methods, respectively. Figures for F test are p values.  
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TABLE 13 
Social Cohesion and FDI Flows: Robustness Check using Full Sample 
Dependent Variable: FDI Flows % GDP (log) 
(Fixed Country and Time Effects) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RP EC IC ET Varimax Promax 
L.FDI 0.267a 0.274a 0.273a 0.274a 0.272a 0.272a 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
GROWTH 0.017b 0.016b 0.016b 0.018b 0.017b 0.018b 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
TRADE 0.467a 0.503a 0.521a 0.498a 0.503a 0.477a 
 (0.157) (0.156) (0.159) (0.158) (0.154) (0.156) 
FINANCE 0.124a 0.126a 0.126a 0.122a 0.124a 0.124a 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
INFRASTRUCTURE -0.012 -0.072 -0.092 -0.072 -0.030 -0.039 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.070) (0.068) (0.066) (0.067) 
COHESION 0.472a 0.482a 0.202b 0.216b 0.050a 0.026c 
 (0.131) (0.182) (0.088) (0.091) (0.019) (0.015) 
Constant -2.314a -2.590a -2.014b -1.675c -1.616c -1.483c 
 (0.863) (0.897) (0.907) (0.871) (0.847) (0.860) 
       
Observations 1,992 1,992 1,992 1,992 1,992 1,992 
R-squared 0.591 0.589 0.589 0.589 0.589 0.588 
Number of countries 101 101 101 101 101 101 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. All variables are in log form except GROWTH. RP, EC, IC, and ET are 
religion in politics, external conflict, internal conflict, and ethnic tensions, respectively. 
Varimax and Promax are the social cohesion principal components using the orthogonal 
and oblique rotation methods, respectively. Figures for F test are p values. 
 But Most of All We Love Each Other: Does Social Cohesion Pay off? 29  
 
TABLE 14 
Social Cohesion and FDI Flows: Robustness Check using Full Sample 
Dependent Variable: FDI Flows % GDP (log)  
(IV Fixed Effects Estimation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RP EC IC ET Varimax Promax 
L.FDI 0.219a 0.231a 0.231a 0.229a 0.229a 0.230a 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
GROWTH 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.021c 0.02 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
TRADE 1.463a 1.363a 1.295a 1.375a 1.262a 1.282a 
 (0.330) (0.344) (0.354) (0.343) (0.333) (0.331) 
FINANCE 0.243a 0.253a 0.260a 0.252a 0.253a 0.249a 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 0.058 0.001 -0.014 0.011 -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.096) (0.097) 
COHESION 0.508a 0.358 0.226 0.220c 0.032 0.018 
 (0.144) (0.285) (0.177) (0.129) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant -7.081a -6.600a -5.952a -6.147a -5.309a -5.390a 
 (1.379) (1.710) (1.638) (1.465) (1.352) (1.344) 
       
Observations 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 
R-squared 0.172 0.169 0.171 0.169 0.173 0.172 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
RP, EC, IC, ET, and PC are religion in politics, external conflict, internal conflict, ethnic 
tensions, and the two social cohesion principal components, respectively. Instrumental 
variables used are L8.GROWTH, L10.TRADE, L2.FINANCE, L3.FINANCE, 
L1.INFRASTSTUCTURE, L2.INFRASTRUCTURE, L1.COHESION (IC) and time dummies. 
Figures for F test are p values. 
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TABLE 15 
Social Cohesion and FDI Flows: Robustness Check using Full Sample 
Dependent Variable: FDI Flows % GDP (log)  
(Two-step System GMM Estimation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RP EC IC ET Varimax Promax 
L.FDI -0.032 -0.091b -0.090b -0.070 -0.092b -0.088b 
 (0.049) (0.044) (0.043) (0.047) (0.043) (0.043) 
GROWTH 0.016c 0.056a 0.058a 0.050a 0.058a 0.058a 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) 
TRADE 1.109a 1.161a 1.161a 1.124a 1.173a 1.189a 
 (0.185) (0.204) (0.205) (0.210) (0.181) (0.196) 
FINANCE -0.008 -0.034 -0.031 -0.029 -0.027 -0.030 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 0.063 0.128 0.131 0.149c 0.125 0.104 
 (0.080) (0.086) (0.091) (0.083) (0.081) (0.083) 
COHESION 0.423c -0.301 -0.132 -0.136 0.115a 0.061 
 (0.246) (0.600) (0.379) (0.183) (0.036) (0.040) 
Constant -4.763a -3.877a -4.304a -4.315a -4.651a -4.629a 
 (0.830) (1.456) (0.990) (0.852) (0.741) (0.787) 
       
Observations 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 1,484 
Number of instruments 168 110 110 139 110 110 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A-B (AR2) test 0.764 0.87 0.868 0.956 0.608 0.766 
Hansen test 1.000 0.610 0.609 0.989 0.650 0.698 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. RP, EC, IC, ET, and PC are religion in politics, external conflict, internal conflict, 
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ethnic tensions, and the two social cohesion principal components, respectively. GMM 
variables are FDI, GROWTH, TRADE, FINANCE, INFRASTRUCTURE, and COHESION (IC). 
Instrumental variables used are L8.GROWTH, L10.TRADE, L2.FINANCE, L3.FINANCE, 
L1.INFRASTSTUCTURE, L2.INFRASTRUCTURE, L1.COHESION (IC) and time dummies. 
Figures for Wald, A-B (AR2), and Hansen tests are p values. 
 
As table 12 and 13 report, country effects estimation shows positive and slightly higher 
influence of religion in politics than the one obtained in the middle income countries sample. The 
social cohesion Varimax-rotated principal component shows positive influence of about 0.05 
percentage point. The country and time fixed effects estimation in table 13 shows an expected 
positive influence of all social cohesion individual institutions and principal components. 
Table 14 reports higher IV estimate and more statistically significant coefficient of religion 
in politics, as well as positive ethnic tensions coefficient. System GMM estimates in table 15 also 
report positive coefficient of religion in politics though marginally significant as well as the 
(Varimax) social cohesion component. 
Trade also has a positive influence on FDI flows similar to the result of the middle income 
country sample. This result holds irrespective of the estimation methodology.   
 
 
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that social cohesion, as the outcome of the interaction of 
different institutions, does not have an influence on the level of FDI inflows a country can attract 
in the middle income countries sample though in the full sample it does. One individual 
institution whose influence is robust is the role of religion in politics. Two questions consequently 
arise. How does religion get manipulated in politics? And what is the evidence in the literature on 
the effect of religion on the economy?  
 
a. How Does Religion Get Manipulated in Politics? 
ICRG defines and measures religion in politics in terms of the domination of society and/or 
governance by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to 
exclude other religions from the political and/or social process. This definition is similar to the 
one adopted by Barro and McCleary (2003) building on Barrett et al. (2001). In examining the 
relationship between religion and economic growth and accounting for endogeneity, Barro and 
McCleary (2003) instrument for religion using dummy variables for the existence of state religion 
in the constitution and of a regulated market structure in which the government approves or 
appoints church leaders, in addition to the composition of a country's religious adherence and a 
measure of religious diversity. Three of these four aspects – existence of state religion in the 
constitution, government appointment or approval of religious leaders and religious diversity - 
reflect how religion is used in politics. 
Religion in politics reduces trust and institutional performance, civic engagement, and 
increases transactions costs. Putnam (1993) argues that hierarchical religions – Catholicism, 
Orthodox Christianity and Islam - discourage trust between people. Trust in turn influences the 
performance of institutions (Fukuyama 1995). Therefore, with the formal adoption of a 
hierarchical religion by the state, it reinforces discouragement of social ties and trust among 
people, and reduces institutional performance. This conjecture is confirmed by La Porta et al. 
(1997): Countries with hierarchical religions are associated with poor institutional performance - 
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low efficiency judiciaries, more corruption, and low-quality bureaucracy – and poor civil 
liberties.
24
  
Since it reduces trust and social ties, the manipulation of religion in politics influences 
society and the conduct of business. On the one hand, reducing trust and social ties weakens 
informal institutions in society, which are an aspect of social capital and social cohesion. On the 
other hand, reducing trust increases transactions costs and diminishes the role of large firms in the 
economy, as La Porta et al. (1997) argue. 
Religion in politics results in an inefficient use of public finances and masks failures and 
crises. As Barro and McCleary (2003) point out, adopting a state religion may require tax 
collection and subsidies directed towards financing church activities. They also add that financing 
these activities is inefficient given the constant output of religious beliefs. In addition to the 
inefficient use of public finances, Platteau (2008) argues that in Islamic countries the use of 
religion in politics can be used to mask failures and crises. Religion, he argues, provides rulers 
with “a cheap default option when they are contested” and accordingly do not undertake the 
necessary institutional reforms.     
 
b. Does Religion Affect Economic Growth? 
These channels suggest that religion (in politics) affects economic growth. Inspired by the 
arguments of Huntington (1996), Landes (1999), and Inglehart and Baker (2000) that economic 
growth should take into account a nation's culture, Barro and McCleary (2003) empirically find 
that religion matters for economic growth.
25
 Some religious beliefs, mainly beliefs in hell and 
heaven, are positively associated with economic growth while church attendance negatively 
associated with growth. They argue that these beliefs influence economic growth through 
personal traits, such as honesty and work ethics. On the other hand, the negative association of 
church attendance with economic growth can be viewed as the inefficient use of resources in 
producing constant output of religious beliefs. Similar to Barro and McCleary (2003), Guiso et al. 
(2003) find that religion shapes attitudes, which are conducive to growth. Replicating and 
robustly checking the results of Barro and McCleary (2003), Durlauf et al. (2012) find little 
evidence in support of religion explaining differences in per capita income growth, however.  
  Searching for determinants of economic growth in the long run, as opposed to examining 
the relationship between religion and economic growth, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) identify 18 out 
of 67 variables used to explain growth in the literature. Among the identified variables are the 
fractions of population who are Confucian, Muslim, and Buddhist, and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization.  Reflecting religious beliefs, the first three variables may link religion to 
economic growth similar to Barro and McCleary (2003). 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
                                                          
24
 In addition to poor institutional performance, La Porta et al. (1997) add poor macroeconomic 
performance - higher inflation and higher rates of tax evasion, poor infrastructure, and lower level of 
importance of large firms in the economy. See also Noland (2005).  
25
 Searching for determinants of economic growth in the long run, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) identify 18 
out of 67 variables used to explain growth in the literature. Among the identified variables are the fractions 
of population who are Confucian, Muslim, and Buddhist, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  The first 
three variables may be linked to religion through religious beliefs. Other variables identified include a) 
regional dummies (East Asia, Africa, and Latin America), b) education (primary schooling),  c) the 
economy (investment price level, GDP, government consumption share, fraction of GDP in mining, and the 
number of years the economy has been open), d) population (fraction of population living in tropical areas, 
and coastal population density), e) health (malaria prevalence and life expectancy), and f) colonization 
(Spanish colonies). 
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 The finding of this paper lends support to the World Bank’s (2013) calls for social 
cohesion. What this paper has found is that religion in politics, conflicts both internal and 
external, and ethnic tensions matter for social cohesion. Of prime importance to attracting FDI 
flows is the role of religion in politics. The empirical evidence may suggest if middle income 
countries are interested in creating more job opportunities and reducing unemployment, through 
attracting more FDI, then governments need to lessen the merger of religion with politics. The 
results of this paper are of particular relevance to Arab Spring countries undergoing political, 
social, and economic transformations. Whether social cohesion influences domestic investment is 
a future research question the answer to which complements the findings of this paper.    
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 APPENDIX A 
Regional Distribution of Sample Countries 
 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Europe & Central 
Asia 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
South Asia Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
China Armenia Argentina Egypt India Botswana 
Indonesia Bulgaria Bolivia Iran Pakistan Cote d'Ivoire 
Malaysia Kazakhstan Brazil Jordan Sri Lanka Ghana 
Mongolia Latvia Chile Lebanon  Namibia 
Papua New Guinea Lithuania Colombia Morocco  Nigeria 
Philippines Moldova Costa Rica Tunisia  South Africa 
Thailand Romania Ecuador   Zambia 
Vietnam Russian Federation El Salvador    
 Serbia Guatemala    
 Turkey Guyana    
 Ukraine Jamaica    
  Mexico    
  Panama    
  Paraguay    
   Peru    
  Uruguay    
  Venezuela    
Notes: Countries are selected based on availability of data for all explanatory variables from both ICRG and WDI. 
 APPENDIX B 
TABLE B1 
Institutional Performance Data Sources 
 
ICRG World Governance Indicators Freedom Index 
Government stability Voice and accountability Political rights 
Socioeconomic conditions Political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism 
Civil liberties 
Investment profile Government effectiveness Freedom status 
Internal conflict Regulatory quality    Free 
External conflict Rule of law    Partly free 
Corruption Control of corruption    Not free 
Military in politics   
Religion in politics   
Law and order   
Ethnic tensions   
Democratic accountability   
Bureaucracy quality   
   
Component score range: 0-100 Component score range: (-2.5) - 2.5 Component score range: 1-7 
Low score=high risk Low score=weak government Low score=High freedom  
   
   
   
   
Period: 1984-2013 Period: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2012 Period: 1973-2013 
Countries: 146 Countries: 215 Countries: 205 
Source: PRS Source: World Bank Source: Freedom House 
 APPENDIX B 
TABLE B2 
Correlation between ICRG and WGI and FI Indexes 
 
 BQ C DA ET EC GS IC IP LO MP RP SC 
 WGI 
WGI 0.85 0.79 0.65 0.37 0.47 0.10 0.65 0.73 0.72 0.80 0.42 0.81 
  CC 0.82 0.84 0.53 0.34 0.38 0.12 0.57 0.66 0.72 0.71 0.35 0.80 
  GE 0.90 0.78 0.59 0.32 0.41 0.10 0.58 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.33 0.84 
  PS 0.61 0.62 0.40 0.56 0.57 0.23 0.82 0.61 0.68 0.75 0.52 0.68 
  RL 0.84 0.79 0.57 0.35 0.42 0.11 0.61 0.72 0.78 0.75 0.32 0.82 
  RQ 0.82 0.72 0.62 0.31 0.45 0.07 0.56 0.78 0.65 0.76 0.35 0.79 
  VA 0.75 0.70 0.84 0.23 0.45 -0.11 0.52 0.62 0.49 0.74 0.42 0.59 
 FI 
FI -0.60 -0.50 -0.81 -0.29 -0.45 -0.11 -0.45 -0.46 -0.43 -0.61 -0.43 -0.42 
  CL -0.60 -0.50 -0.78 -0.30 -0.46 -0.13 -0.47 -0.49 -0.45 -0.61 -0.43 -0.44 
  PR -0.58 -0.49 -0.79 -0.27 -0.43 -0.09 -0.42 -0.42 -0.40 -0.59 -0.41 -0.38 
  Status -0.50 -0.42 -0.70 -0.26 -0.37 -0.07 -0.37 -0.37 -0.35 -0.53 -0.38 -0.34 
Notes: BQ: bureaucracy quality. C: Corruption. DA: democratic accountability. ET: ethnic tensions. EC: external conflict. GS: government 
stability. IC: internal conflict. IP: investment profile. LO: law and order. MP: military in politics. RP: religion in politics. SC: Socioeconomic 
 conditions. CC: Corruption control. GE: Government effectiveness. PS: Political stability. RL: Rule of law. RQ: Regulatory quality. VA: Voice 
and accountability. CL: Civil liberties. PR: Political Rights. Bold fonts indicate correlation of about 0.5 and above. 
 
 
